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Abstract
Children until the age of five are only able to reverse an ambiguous figure when they are informed about the second inter-
pretation. In two experiments, we examined whether children’s difficulties would extend to a continuous version of the 
ambiguous figures task. Children (Experiment 1: 66 3- to 5-year olds; Experiment 2: 54 4- to 9-year olds) and adult controls 
saw line drawings of animals gradually morph—through well-known ambiguous figures—into other animals. Results show 
a relatively late developing ability to recognize the target animal, with difficulties extending beyond preschool-age. This 
delay can neither be explained with improvements in theory of mind, inhibitory control, nor individual differences in eye 
movements. Even the best achieving children only started to approach adult level performance at the age of 9, suggesting a 
fundamentally different processing style in children and adults.
Introduction
Reversible or ambiguous figures like the Rubin’s face/vase 
picture or the Necker cube have been used to study how 
people spontaneously alternate between two mutually exclu-
sive interpretations of objectively stable pictures. The abil-
ity to reverse ambiguous figures depends on a combination 
of top–down and bottom–up processes (Intaitė, Noreika, 
Šoliūnas, & Falter, 2013; Long & Toppino, 2004), including 
recurring neural fatigue (review in Long & Toppino, 1981, 
2004), gaze orientation (Ruggieri & Fernandez, 1994), 
mental imagery (Doherty & Wimmer, 2005) and context 
effects (Intaitė et al., 2013). A critical factor that determines 
whether participants are able to reverse an ambiguous figure 
is the amount of information given about the two potential 
interpretations (Mitroff, Sobel, & Gopnik, 2006). (1) When 
no information is given, one needs to be aware of the ambi-
guity (i.e., uninformed reversal). Adults rarely ever reverse 
spontaneously (Rock & Mitchener, 1992). (2) When aware 
of the ambiguity, one needs to explore or generate potential 
alternative interpretations (i.e., ambiguity-informed rever-
sal). Under these conditions, about 50% of adults are able to 
recognize the second interpretation (Girgus, Rock, & Egatz, 
1977). (3) When both ambiguity and content are known, the 
perceiver must be able to conceive of a figure having more 
than one interpretation to flexibly alternate between those 
two (i.e., content informed reversal), a requirement that was 
only initially evident in children (Doherty & Wimmer, 2005; 
Gopnik & Rosati, 2001).
Children up to 5 years almost never show uninformed 
reversals (Girgus et al., 1977; Rock, Gopnik, & Hall, 1994; 
Rock & Mitchener, 1992)—and even struggle with content 
informed reversals (Gopnik & Rosati, 2001; Rock, Hall, & 
Davis, 1994; Wimmer & Doherty, 2011). In fact, even the 
majority of 5- to 9-year olds fail to reverse ambiguous fig-
ures spontaneously (Mitroff et al., 2006). Although reversal 
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rates increase throughout childhood (Holt & Matson, 1976), 
they still do not reach adult level by age 10 (Ehlers, Strüber, 
& Basar-Eroglu, 2016).
This developmental phenomenon is compelling and 
requires further investigation for two reasons. A late onset 
may either reflect an ontogenetically emerging basic, low-
level perceptual process or a cognitively demanding, late-
manifesting process. Previous research has produced mixed 
findings. Gopnik and Rosati (2001) showed that reversals 
were closely linked with tasks that elicited non-perceptual, 
multiple representations (e.g., false belief task), suggest-
ing that the ability to reverse depends upon late-developing 
cognitive abilities. Yet, more recent evidence (Doherty & 
Wimmer, 2005; Wimmer & Doherty, 2011) does not find a 
direct relation between false belief performance and switch-
ing interpretations. The current set of studies was designed 
to further investigate this question.
Another reason to investigate this phenomenon devel-
opmentally is that children, even when informed about the 
ambiguity, are unlikely to reverse. Ambiguity-informed 
reversals explicitly require children to explore or generate 
potential alternative interpretations. Children, however, 
fail to switch between interpretations—even when they 
have acknowledged their existence beforehand (Doherty & 
Wimmer, 2005). While children may simply be reluctant 
to switch interpretations in view of physically unchanged 
objects, this seems unlikely to explain their difficulties, 
given that children were encouraged to report any changes 
they saw (Gopnik & Rosati, 2001). Alternatively, once chil-
dren understand that two interpretations are possible, they 
may struggle to (voluntarily) inhibit one interpretation over 
the other. An increased ability to reverse would then be an 
indicator of bottom–up development through successful 
inhibition (Bialystok & Shapero, 2005; Wimmer & Doherty, 
2011).
Also, earlier studies reported an association between con-
tent informed reversal and theory of mind (Gopnik & Rosati, 
2001; Mitroff et al., 2006) which was not confirmed in later 
studies (Doherty & Wimmer, 2005; Wimmer & Doherty, 
2011). Studies that found a positive association argued that 
considering someone else’s belief and understanding ambi-
guity both require children to have an abstract understand-
ing of perspective (for a discussion see Perner, Stummer, 
Sprung, & Doherty, 2002).
In the current study, we used a continuous version of 
the ambiguous figures task. In this task, an animal (e.g., a 
duck) morphs over 15 iterations into another animal (e.g., a 
rabbit) with picture #8 depicting a well-known ambiguous 
figure (e.g., duck–rabbit, Wittgenstein, 1953). This picture 
morphing task (Stöttinger et al., 2014; see also Burnett & 
Jellema, 2013) measures how many morphs participants 
need before they switch to the new interpretation (i.e., rab-
bit). Unlike in previous studies, children were not informed 
about the content of the second interpretation, only about 
its potential for another interpretation. Participants have to 
generate alternative perspectives (i.e., it could transform 
into a cat, a dog, a fish, etc.), and compare or rank perspec-
tives (i.e., at some point it cannot be a fish anymore, given 
the ears) to report the target animal. Thus, possible alterna-
tives cannot be chosen randomly but need to be consistent 
with the actual stimulus. Otherwise, the amount of potential 
alternative explanations would be overwhelming, ultimately 
hampering efficient updating.
The picture morphing task, therefore, provides several 
advantages over the standard ambiguous figure task: (1) 
the continuous measure makes it possible to test children 
younger than 5 years, who would have otherwise rarely 
reversed (Gopnik & Rosati, 2001). (2) It introduces variance 
into a typically dichotomous measure. (3) Most importantly, 
it allows to capture gradual developmental improvements 
and to quantify any specific deficits in this form of reversal.
In Experiment 1, we assessed children’s developmental 
progression on the picture morphing task and compared it 
to performance of adult participants exposed to the same 
stimulus material. We were particularly interested in whether 
younger children would need more morphing stages until 
they named the emerging animal compared to older children 
and adults. This task has never been administered in children 
before. It is therefore difficult to make any definitive predic-
tions about how they will perform. In a similar vein, we can 
only speculate which other factors may influence recogni-
tion of the second object. We tested whether children who 
master the standard false belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983) will identify the second object in the picture morphing 
task sooner. In addition, we tested whether executive func-
tioning and selective attention would influence children’s 
performance in the picture morphing task—both of which 
were previously hypothesized to affect performance on the 
ambiguous figures task. Increased inhibitory control (i.e., 
the ability to withhold the previous representation of the 
stimulus and exchange it for the conflicting option) could 
help children to ascribe a different meaning to the picture 
(Bialystok & Shapero, 2005). Wimmer and Doherty (2011) 
found that performance on the day/night Stroop task (Ger-
stadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994), a measure of inhibitory 
control, predicted ambiguous figure switching. We, there-
fore, used the same task in our study.
For exploratory purposes, we also recorded children’s eye 
movements to test whether picture morphing effects relate to 
individual differences in visual inspection of the pictures. In 
adult participants, impoverished control of selective atten-
tion led to lower sampling of informative parts of the stim-
ulus (Tsal & Kolbet, 1985) and could explain variance in 
the picture morphing task (Ruggieri & Fernandez, 1994). 
Also, fixations recorded prior to object recognition predicted 
which interpretation of an ambiguous image was reported 
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(Kietzmann, Geuter, & König, 2011). Wimmer and Doherty 
(2007), however, failed to find any difference in eye move-
ment patterns between children who reversed an ambiguous 
figure and children who failed to do so.
Results of Experiment 1 revealed that children in all age 
groups required more morphs to switch interpretations than 
adult controls, with no significant improvements within the 
child group. In Experiment 2, we tested older children (up 
to 9 years) to examine at which age the ability to report the 




Participants were 66 3- to 5-year olds (Mage = 54.95 months; 
SD = 10.46, age range 37–71, 33 girls) from five nurseries 
in Austria and Germany. Parents gave written consent and 
the children gave their assent to participation. Seventeen 
additional children failed to complete at least two sets of 
the picture morphing task (see “Procedure and materials”) 
and were excluded.
Adults
Seventy-six participants (Mage = 36.82 years, SD = 9.07; 
age range 22–61 years; 30 females) were recruited through 
Mechanical Turk. All participants gave informed written 
consent prior to participation by clicking on the “I agree” 
button. Five additional participants were excluded because 
they quit the task prematurely within the first set (n = 2) or 
failed to complete at least two sets of the picture morphing 
task (n = 3). Participants received $2 for their participation. 
Ethical approval was granted by the Ethics Panel of the Uni-
versity of Salzburg, following the principles expressed in the 
Declaration of Helsinki.
Design
Each participant was exposed to four sets of the picture mor-
phing task (Fig. 1a). Children additionally received (a) a 
brief check that they knew the names of the animals in the 
task prior to the morphing task, (b) an unexpected transfer 
false belief task (Perner, Mauer, & Hildenbrand, 2011) and 
(c) a day/night Stroop task (Gerstadt et al., 1994). Half of the 
children received the picture morphing task prior to the false 
belief task and the day/night Stroop task; half had the reverse 
order. The order of the false belief task and the Stroop task 
was fully counterbalanced. Testing of children lasted up to 
30 min and took place in a quiet room at children’s nurseries. 




Four sets of line drawings were used (Fig. 1a), two (duck/
rabbit and swan/cat) were taken from Stöttinger et al. (2014), 
and two (horse/seal and snail/whale) were created by the 
last author in Paint©. Each set was based on a well-known 
ambiguous figure (Bernstein & Cooper, 1997; Fisher, 1968; 
Jastrow, 1900; Wittgenstein, 1953). Over 15 iterations, an 
unambiguous representation of an animal (e.g., a duck) mor-
phed into an unambiguous representation of a different ani-
mal (e.g., rabbit). The eighth picture of each set represented 
the most ambiguous figure. At the fourth and fourteenth 
positions, a ‘catch’ object was included to evaluate whether 
participants simply perseverated on a single response. Pic-
tures (for children: 12 × 12 cm; for adults: 300 × 300 pixels) 
were presented on a computer monitor one at a time (black 
on white background). Set order followed a Latin Square 
Design. Morphing direction (e.g., duck to rabbit vs. rabbit 
to duck) was fully counterbalanced.
Participants were told that they would see the picture of 
an animal gradually changing into another animal. They 
were asked to verbally state what they saw (children) or to 
type in the word (adults) for each picture. Answers were 
rated as first or second object when they fit the general con-
cept (e.g., swan, duck, bird, stork, etc. were rated as “swan”). 
Answers not matching the concept (e.g., “snake”), and omis-
sions, were categorized as “other”. The categorization was 
done independently by two raters with an interrater agree-
ment of 98.1%. Cases of disagreement were discussed and 
resolved to mutual satisfaction. The dependent variable was 
the picture position at which participants reported the second 
object.
Sets were coded as completed, following three criteria: 
(1) both catch trials were identified correctly; (2) the second 
interpretation was identified correctly at least once; and (3) 
no “other” reports were made.
In children, eye movements were recorded throughout 
the picture morphing task to test whether second object 
interpretations were related to their visual inspection of the 
drawings. Eye movements were recorded monocularly from 
the right eye with an EyeLink 1000 (SR-Research, Ontario, 
Canada) eye tracker at a sampling rate of 500 Hz. We used 
the “remote” setup that did not require head stabilization 
but tracked a target sticker on the children’s forehead. The 
viewing distance was approximately 50 cm. Stimuli were 
presented on a 17-in. CRT-monitor with a resolution of 
1024 × 768 pixel and a frame rate of 60 Hz. A three-point 
calibration routine preceded the experiment. Each picture 
 Psychological Research
1 3
set was preceded by a fixation control for which the children 
had to fixate a centrally presented cross for a minimum dura-
tion of 150 ms. If the fixation control procedure failed, the 
system was re-calibrated. Thereafter, the picture morphing 
task was presented one picture at a time. Each picture was 
presented until the child gave a response. Eye-tracking data 
Fig. 1  a Stimuli in the picture morphing task. b Overall percentages 
of reports for children in Experiment 1 (left), children in Experi-
ment 2 (center) and adult participants (right)—averaged over all 
picture sets. The x-axis represents the gradual morph from the first 
object (100% the first object) to the second object (0% first object). 
The black solid line represents the responses (in %) identifying the 
first object, the gray solid line displays the responses identifying the 
second object. The dashed line represents answers other than the first 
or second object. c Average percentage of participants reporting the 
second object (y-axis) at each of the fifteen morphing stages (x-axis) 
for valid picture sets for Experiment 1 (left) and Experiment 2 (right)
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were analyzed with R (R Core Team, 2019). We considered 
mean number of fixations, mean fixation duration (exclud-
ing fixations of less than 80 ms) and mean summed saccade 
length per picture in each sequence as dependent measures.
Unexpected transfer false belief task
We used a PowerPoint© version of the unexpected transfer 
false belief task (Perner et al., 2011). A female doll, Lisa, 
puts a teddy into a red box and leaves. A male doll, Tom, 
enters, transfers the teddy into a yellow box and leaves. Chil-
dren were asked four Comprehension Questions: (1) where 
did Lisa place the teddy? (2) Where is the teddy now? (3) 
Who placed it there? and (4) did Lisa see that? If children 
gave one or more incorrect answers, the entire scenario was 
repeated until all control questions were answered correctly 
(n = 18). Finally, Lisa returned and children were asked 
where she will look first for her teddy (prediction question).
Regardless of whether children made a correct prediction 
or not, Lisa was then shown to search in the red box and 
children were asked to explain her behavior (explanation 
question). Following Wimmer and Mayringer (1998), expla-
nations were considered correct when they either contained 
appropriate mental state words (e.g., “she thought the teddy 
was in there”; “she did not see it being moved”) or relevant 
story facts (e.g., “she had put it in the red box”; “somebody 
has taken the teddy away”). All other answers were catego-
rized as incorrect.
Day/night Stroop task
We used one set of cards (13.5 × 10 cm) following the day/
night Stroop task by Gerstadt et al., (1994). Children were 
instructed to say “day” when shown a black card with a white 
moon and stars and to say “night” when shown a white card 
with a yellow sun. Subsequently, children were presented 
with a total of 16 cards in the order night (n), day (d), d, n, d, 
n, n, d, d, n, d, n, n, d, n, d. If children responded incorrectly 
on one of the first two trials, they were reminded of the rules 
(two times at maximum) and the test was restarted. There-
after, children received no direct feedback. The dependent 
measure was the number of trials answered correctly.
Results
Picture morphing task
Only complete picture sets were included in the analysis (see 
Procedure and Materials section for more details). Three 
percent of all responses in adults and 6% of all responses in 
children comprised “other” responses, equally distributed 
over the course of the task (Fig. 1b).
The most excluded picture set was the cat/swan set, but 
exclusion rates were comparable between children and adults 
for each picture set (cat/swan: 32% children, 26% adults; 
duck/rabbit: 8% children, 7% adults; horse/seal: 14% chil-
dren, 9% adults; snail/whale: 18% children, 17% adults). 
On average, children completed 3.29 ± 0.72 sets (2 sets: 
n = 10; 3 sets: n = 27; 4 sets:  n = 29), adults 3.41 ± 0.75 sets 
(2 sets:  n = 12; 3 sets: n = 21; 4 sets: n = 43), with both 
participant groups being worse at reversing the horse/seal 
picture set compared to the other three sets.1 As participants 
progressed from set 1 through to set 4, the average number at 
which participants identified the second object stayed rela-
tively constant,2 meaning that participants did not improve 
throughout the task (Figure 1 in Supplemental Materials).
Finally, the average picture number at which a switch was 
reported across all valid sets was submitted to an analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) for participant group (children vs. 
adults). This analysis revealed a highly significant main 
effect [F(1, 140) = 137.23, p < 0.001, η2= 0.50]. Adults iden-
tified the second object on average at picture #8 (M = 8.38, 
SD = 1.89), and therefore significantly earlier than children, 
who identified the second object at around picture #12 
(M = 11.99, SD = 1.76) (Fig. 1a, c, left panel).
Correlation between performance in the picture 
morphing task and other cognitive abilities
In the false belief test, 45 (68%) children correctly predicted 
that Lisa would search in the empty location (prediction 
question). Regardless of whether children made a correct 
prediction or not, they were asked to explain her behavior 
(explanation question). Twenty-eight children (42%) cor-
rectly answered the explanation question, the majority of 
whom (n = 23) referred to relevant story facts. In the day/
1 A mixed-effect ANOVA for the average picture number at which 
a switch was reported was calculated with the picture set (duck–rab-
bit, cat–swan, horse–seal, snail–whale) as a within-subjects fac-
tor and participant group (children vs. adults) as a between-subjects 
factor. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for partici-
pant group [F(1, 70) = 83.68, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.54], and picture set 
[F(3, 210) = 6.47, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.09], but no significant interaction 
between participant group × picture set [F(3, 210) = 0.49, p > 0.65, 
µ2 = 0.007]. Overall, participants identified the second object later in 
the horse/seal picture set compared to all other sets (pairwise—Bon-
ferroni corrected—t test; smallest p value = 0.012). Note, this analysis 
comprises a smaller sample, because only 29 children and 43 adults 
completed all four sets.
2 The same mixed-effect ANOVA was calculated for set order (set 
1–set 4) as the within-subjects factor. This analysis revealed a sig-
nificant main effect for participant group only [F(1, 70) = 83.68, 
p < 0.001; η2 = 0.54] with neither a significant effect for set order 
[F(3, 210) = 1.28, p > 0.25; η2 = 0.02], nor a significant interaction 




night Stroop inhibitory control task, out of 16 possible 
responses, children gave 10.8 (SD = 5.01) correct answers 
on average. To test whether there is a connection between 
performance in the false belief task (correct prediction and 
explanation), day/night Stroop task and picture morphing 
task (average number of first objects reports for valid sets), 
we calculated correlations as well as partial correlations con-
trolling for age (Table 1).
Age correlated with all measures except performance in 
the picture morphing task. Performance in the prediction and 
explanation question also correlated moderately, but this fell 
short of significance when age was controlled for (upper half 
of Table 1). No other correlations were significant.
Eye‑tracking data
A median split was used to divide children into “early” 
(i.e., ≤ 11 pictures; M = 9.72 ± 1.50) and “late” switchers 
(i.e., > 11 pictures; M = 12.33 ± 0.66 pictures) based on the 
average number of first object reports they made before 
reporting the second object in the picture morphing task. 
Figure 2 shows mean number of fixations, mean fixation 
duration, and mean summed saccade length for eight pic-
tures prior to the switch (T-8 to T-1), at the switch (T0), and 
one picture after the switch (T1).
Data were submitted to three separate mixed factorial 
repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA)3 for (1) 
mean number of fixations, (2) mean fixation duration, and 
(3) mean summed saccade length as dependent variables 
and time point of switch (i.e., the eight pictures prior to 
the switch, the picture at the switch as well as one picture 
after the switch) as the within-subjects factor and perfor-
mance group (early vs. late) as the between-subjects factor. 
Analyses revealed significant main effects for time of switch 
and performance group: the average number of fixations 
[F(9, 504) = 6.36, p < 0.001, η2= 0.10], the average fixation 
duration [F(9, 504) = 6.15, p < 0.001, η2= 0.10], as well as 
the saccade length [F(9, 504) = 3.64, p < 0.001, η2= 0.06], 
all peaked at the moment of the switch (pairwise—Bon-
ferroni corrected—t test for post hoc analyses; highest p 
value = 0.027; Fig. 2). Early switchers showed significantly 
larger number of fixations [F(1, 56) = 10.05, p < 0.01, 
η2= 0.15], longer mean fixation durations [F(1, 56) = 7.31, 
Table 1  Pairwise correlations [partial correlations controlling for 
age] between picture morphing task, false belief task (separate for 
prediction and explanation question), day/night Stroop task, and age
+ p <0.1, *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001 (two-tailed)
1 2 3 4
1. Picture morphing – [0.069] [− 0.094] [0.009]
2. Prediction 0.001 – [0.081] [− 0.044]
3. Explanation − 0.146 0.257* – [0.018]
4. Day/night Stroop − 0.051 0.143 0.200 –
5. Age (months) − 0.141 0.430*** 0.447*** 0.416**
Fig. 2  Mean number of fixations, mean fixation duration (in ms), and 
summed saccade length (in mm) for eight pictures prior to the switch 
(T-8 to T-1), at the switch (T0), and one picture after the switch (T1), 
separate for “early” (≤ 11 pictures) and “late” switchers (> 11 pic-
tures) in the picture morphing task. Error bars represent the standard 
error of the mean (SEM)
3 Note that data were not available for fourteen children due to 
problems during the calibration procedure. Behavioral data for the 
remaining 52 children (Mage = 55.92  months) closely resembles 
results for the entire group (i.e., Median = 11;  Meanhigh performers = 9.86 
± 1.20;  Meanlow performers = 12.22 ± 0.65).
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p < 0.01, η2= 0.12], and longer saccades [F(1, 56) = 4.24, 
p < 0.05, η2= 0.07]. None of the interactions between time 
× performance group reached significance (all ps > 0.15), 
indicating that the two groups did not differ in their inspec-
tion patterns over time.
For exploratory analysis, we created heat maps for the 
rabbit/duck picture-set. This set was selected because it had 
the highest number of valid data sets and the highest number 
of eye tracking data sets available (n = 29). Also, there was 
considerable variance between participants which allowed 
us to divide the sample into early (n = 13) and late switching 
groups (n = 16) based on where children reported the second 
object in this particular set. Children in the early switch-
ing group reported seeing the duck between picture #7 and 
#8 (M = 7.54, SD = 1.76). This was on average one to two 
pictures later compared to adults’ performance in the same 
picture-set [M = 5.82, SD = 1.52; t(50) = 3.39, p < 0.01]. The 
late switching group reported seeing the duck on average 
between picture #12 and #13 (M = 12.56, SD = 1.32), there-
fore significantly later than adults [t(53) = 15.51, p < 0.001] 
and early switching children [t(27) = 8.80, p < 0.001]. 
Heat maps were created for each of the fifteen pictures—
separately displayed for the early and late switching group 
(Fig. 3). These heat maps color-code the density of fixation 
locations (weighted with regards to the duration of the fixa-
tion). In other words, they illustrate the allocation of visual 
attention to the pictures with warmer colors indicating more 
attention. As evident in Fig. 3, children who recognized 
the duck later focused mainly on the eye for the first nine 
pictures; whereas, children who identified the duck earlier 
allocated their attention also on a second area (i.e., the area 
around the beak). Also, earlier switching children seemed 
to be more attentive to actual changes between the pictures 
(e.g., picture #11, #12, and #13) than later switching chil-
dren—whose attention was again mostly drawn towards the 
eye of the figure.
Discussion
Children overall reported the second object much later 
(i.e., at picture #12) than adults (i.e., at picture #8) and 
only when the picture displayed predominantly the second 
object (Fig. 1a). Also, there was no clear developmental 
improvement despite older children outperforming younger 
children on theory of mind and inhibitory control (Table 1). 
While these factors have affected the probability of content 
informed reversal in previous studies (Bialystok & Shapero, 
2005; Doherty & Wimmer, 2005; Gopnik & Rosati, 2001; 
Mitroff et al., 2006; but see Ropar Mitchell, & Ackroyd, 
2003), none of these measures affected performance on the 
picture morphing task (i.e., when children were naïve as 
to the second interpretation, but were continuously shifted 
towards that interpretation).
It is plausible to assume that children switched so late 
due to the rather impoverished silhouette type displays of 
objects. While we cannot fully rule out that children strug-
gled more than adults with the stimuli, all children were 
able to name animals based on line drawings in the word 
naming check prior to the picture morphing task. Although 
stimuli in the middle were highly ambiguous and suggestive 
of more than one interpretation, “other” reports for chil-
dren (and adults) did not peak at the most ambiguous figure. 
Instead, they were equally distributed across all picture posi-
tions (Fig. 1b). Critically, adults gave similar “other” reports 
as did children (e.g., “dinosaur” in the cat–swan picture set) 
Fig. 3  Heat maps of the cumulative number of fixations displayed 
separately for “early” (≤ 11 pictures, top) and “late” switchers (> 11 
pictures, center) with warmer colors indicating more attention. (For 
interpretation of the references to color, the reader is referred to the 
web version of this article.). The dotted squares represent where par-
ticipants on average reported a shift in perception. The bottom row 
highlights the area of change from one picture to the next
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and a comparable proportion of sets had to be excluded in 
both participant groups. Also, children and adults found it 
harder to reverse the horse–seal picture set compared to the 
other sets.
One may argue that the word naming check prior to the 
picture morphing task primed children to search for those 
same animals. This, however, should have made the task 
easier for children and cannot explain their delayed recogni-
tion of the second object. Children who used more exten-
sive search strategies—as suggested by longer and a higher 
number of fixations as well as longer saccades—identified 
the second object earlier. For one of the picture sets, quali-
tative analysis of fixation patterns revealed an interesting 
trend. Children who switched later focused mainly on the 
eye of the figure, while children who recognized the second 
object earlier were also able to direct their attention to other 
regions. They still, however, did not reach adult level per-
formance. Children in all age groups required more pictures 
before they reported the second object compared to adult 
participants, with no significant age improvements.
In Experiment 2, we, therefore, extended the age (up to 
9 years) to examine at which age the ability to report the 
second object in the picture morphing task improves. In 
addition, we measured theory of mind and inhibitory skills, 
using a different type of measurement. Advanced theory of 
mind skills were measured using Happé’s strange stories 
(O’Hare, Bremner, Nash, Happé, & Pettigrew, 2009). This 
task was previously used to assess mentalizing skills in 
middle childhood (Devine & Hughes, 2013) and was con-
sequently regarded as an appropriate task for our sample. 
Further, because the day/night Stroop task by Gerstadt et al., 
(1994) was not related to the picture morphing task, we sub-
stituted the Stroop task with the Simon task (picture test) 
by Davidson, Amso, Anderson, and Diamond (2006). This 
task is also appropriate for the age range tested but assesses 
slightly different skills. While the Stroop task in Experiment 
1 requires the inhibition of conceptually incompatible stim-
uli, which is expected to be developed in middle childhood, 
participants in the Simon task need to inhibit responses that 
are spatially incompatible with the stimuli. In other words, 
it examines competition at the stimulus response level (Liu, 
Banich, Jacobson, & Tanabe, 2004), which we deem relevant 
in our task where local changes increasingly fail to match the 
global representation of the animal.
Although qualitative analysis of fixation patterns revealed 
an interesting trend, we did not include eye-tracking metrics 
in the follow-up experiment. We were able to confidently 
measure number and duration of fixations as well as saccade 
length in Experiment 1. Yet, the restricted number of valid 
sets for which we had eye tracking data only allowed us to 
link fixation location with the actual interpretation of the 
picture in one picture set in Experiment 1. While we would 
have had enough data for a similar analysis in two other 
picture sets (i.e., snail–whale: n = 27; horse–seal: n = 29), 
these sets did not produce enough variance in responses to 
separate groups into early and late switchers. That is, more 
than 80% of participants reported the second object at—
or later than—picture #11. For meaningful insights from 
an ROI analysis we would have to select new picture sets 
that produce more variance. Because we further wanted 
to establish at which age children would reach adult level 
performance, we opted against changing the picture sets in 
Experiment 2 that would have allowed for such analysis.
Experiment 2
Participants
Fifty-four 4- to 9-year olds (Mage = 83.41  months; 
SD = 14.52, age range 55–113, 26 girls) from five nurser-
ies and one school in Germany took part. Three additional 
children failed to complete at least two sets of the picture 
morphing task and were excluded. Children’s parents gave 
written informed consent. Ethical approval was granted by 
the Ethics Panel of the University of Salzburg, following the 
principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki.
For later analysis, we spilt the sample into 
four similar-sized groups: 5.5-year olds: (n = 13, 
Mage = 63.79  months, age range 55–70), 6.5-year olds 
(n = 13, Mage = 76.85 months, age range 72–85), 7.5-year 
olds (n = 14, Mage = 90.21 months, age range 86–93), and 
8.5-year olds (n = 14, Mage = 100.79  months, age range 
94–113).
Design
Each child was exposed to the picture morphing task of 
Experiment 1. A test of advanced theory of mind (strange 
stories suitable for 4- to 9-year olds, Happé, 1994; O’Hare, 
Bremner, Nash, Happé, & Pettigrew, 2009) and a Simon task 
(picture test, Davidson et al., 2006) were administered. Task 
order followed a Latin square design.
Procedure and materials
Test of advanced theory of mind
Three strange stories based on Happé (1994) were admin-
istered: lie (dentist), forget (doll) and misunderstand-
ing (glove). We selected these three stories because they 
showed variance in performance even in 5-year olds (O’Hare 
et al., 2009). For example, in the dentist story children were 
told about John, who hates going to the dentist. Anytime 
John has toothache, he needs a filling and that hurts. At the 
moment John has bad toothache but when his mother asks 
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him whether he has toothache he says “No, Mummy.” Pro-
tagonists in these stories made statements they did not mean 
literally, and children were asked “Was it true what X said?” 
and “Why did X say this?” Scoring followed O’Hare et al. 
(2009).
Simon task
Color pictures of frogs and butterflies appeared on the left or 
right side of the computer screen. Children were instructed 
to press the green bell, if they saw a frog, and the pink bell, 
if they saw a butterfly. In congruent trials, animals appeared 
on the same side as the assigned bell; in incongruent trials, 
they appeared on the opposite side, and in mixed trials on 
both sides. Every condition consisted of 20 pictures, pre-
sented for 750 ms each, followed by a black fixation cross. 
Children received an initial practice with five pictures. We 
used accuracy (i.e., pressing the green bell upon a frog’s 
appearance, and the pink bell upon the butterfly’s appear-
ance) as the measure.
Results
Picture morphing
Seven percent of all responses comprised “other” responses, 
equally distributed over the course of the task (Fig. 1b, mid-
dle panel). The most sets had to be excluded in the cat/swan 
(22%) and snail/whale (22%) picture sets with only a few 
exclusions for duck/rabbit (4%) and horse/seal (7%). On 
average, children completed 3.44 ± 0.74 sets (2 sets: n = 8; 
3 sets: n = 14; 4 sets: n = 32). As they progressed from set 1 
through to set 4, the average number at which they identified 
the second object stayed relatively constant.4 As in Experi-
ment 1, children recognized the second object later in the 
horse–seal picture set compared to the other three sets.5
As in Experiment 1, the picture number at which children 
reported the second object was averaged across all valid sets 
and compared against performance of adults in Experiment 
1. This analysis of variance (ANOVA) for participant group 
(children vs. adults) revealed a highly significant difference 
between children and adults [F(1, 128) = 40.77, p = 0.001, 
η2= 0.24]. Children reported the second object on aver-
age two pictures later (M = 10.54, SD = 1.91) than adults 
(M = 8.38, SD = 1.89) (Fig. 1a).
Restricting the ANOVA to children (5.5-year olds, 6.5-
year olds, 7.5-year olds, and 8.5-year olds with 13–14 
children in each group) showed that the youngest children 
(M = 11.89, SD = 1.06) needed significantly more pictures 
to identify the emerging animal compared to the 7.5-year 
olds (M = 9.92, SD = 1.79) and the oldest children (M = 9.49, 
SD= 2.07) [F(3, 50) = 5.36, p = 0.003, η2= 0.24; post hoc 
Bonferroni corrected all p’s< 0.05]. No significant differ-
ence was found between 5.5- and 6.5-year olds (M = 10.98, 
SD = 1.72; post hoc Bonferroni: p = 1) (Fig. 1c, right panel). 
The first three age groups reported the second object sig-
nificantly later than adult participants (post hoc Bonferroni 
corrected all p’s < 0.05), with the oldest age group approach-
ing adult level performance (post hoc Bonferroni corrected 
p = 0.20).
Correlation between performance in the picture 
morphing task with other cognitive abilities
Children achieved a mean score of 4.35 (SD = 1.78) out 
of a possible maximum score of 6 in the test of advanced 
theory of mind. In the Simon task, children made signifi-
cantly fewer errors in congruent trials (M = 1.46, SD= 2.44) 
than in incongruent trials (M = 2.54, SD= 2.87), t(51) = 3.87, 
p < 0.001, or mixed trials (M = 2.44, SD= 3.27), t(51) = 3.41, 
p = 0.001, which did not differ, t(51) = 0.26, p = 0.79. We 
again calculated correlations and partial correlations (con-
trolling for age) to assess a connection between inhibitory 
control and theory of mind with performance in the picture 
morphing task.
Age correlated with all measures. Performance in the 
picture morphing task correlated with all measures in the 
Simon task. Theory of mind also correlated with perfor-
mance in the congruent and incongruent trials of the Simon 
task. None of these correlations remained significant after 
controlling for age (upper half of Table 2).
Discussion
The aim of the second experiment was to look at the devel-
opmental trajectory in the picture morphing task beyond 
pre-school age and to further investigate the relation with 
theory of mind and inhibitory skills. The ability to identify 
the second object improved reliably from 4 years to 9 years, 
with older children needing significantly fewer pictures to 
update their representation of the visual stimuli compared to 
4 A repeated-measures analysis for the average picture number at 
which a switch was reported was calculated for set order (set 1–set 4) 
as independent variable. This analysis revealed a small but significant 
effect [F(3, 93) = 2.76, p = 0.046; η2 = 0.08] with a benefit for set 3 
compared to the other sets. This effect, however, did not survive Bon-
ferroni correction for multiple comparison.
5 A repeated-measures analysis for picture set (duck–rabbit, cat–
swan, horse–seal, snail–whale) showed a significant effect: F(3, 
93) = 5.92, p < 0.01; η2 = 0.16. Children identified the second object 
later in the horse–seal picture set compared to all other picture sets 
(pairwise t test; all p’s< 0.05), although the comparison of the horse–




younger children. Replicating Experiment 1, we again failed 
to find a connection with inhibition and theory of mind 
despite using a refined measurement. Also, children were 
able to identify catch trials successfully, showing that they 
are in principle capable of inhibiting prepotent responses 
when faced with a completely different image. It is, there-
fore, unlikely that inhibitory deficits can account for the 
developmental effects found in our study.
General discussion
To date, there are only a handful studies investigating how 
children reverse ambiguous figures. These studies typi-
cally find that young children never spontaneously reverse 
(Girgus et al., 1977; Gopnik & Rosati, 2001; Mitroff et al., 
2006; Rock & Mitchener, 1992; Wimmer & Doherty, 2011) 
and even 10-year olds still show lower reversal rates than 
adults (Ehlers et al., 2016). Children until the age of five 
are only able to alternate between two interpretations of an 
ambiguous figure when they are informed about the second 
interpretation beforehand (i.e., content informed reversal). 
The present set of studies used a continuous version of the 
ambiguous figures task to measure how children switch to 
a second interpretation under conditions where they were 
naïve as to the second object and where each change in the 
picture increasingly supported the alternative interpretation.
In both experiments, we found that children switched 
much later than adult participants. Performance in the pic-
ture morphing task improved with age—as demonstrated 
in Experiment 2—with 8.5-year olds (M = 9.49) starting 
to approach the level of adult participants (M = 8.38). Our 
results are, therefore, in line with earlier findings showing 
an improvement with age on reversals of ambiguous figures 
(Ehlers et al., 2016; Girgus et al., 1977; Gopnik & Rosati, 
2001; Mitroff et al., 2006; Rock & Mitchener, 1992; Wim-
mer & Doherty, 2011).
We further investigated whether children who possessed 
advanced theory of mind understanding and strong inhibi-
tory skills would recognize the second object sooner in the 
picture morphing task. None of these measures predicted 
performance in our continuous ambiguous figures task. Pre-
vious research has found inconsistent evidence for a link 
between reversals and false belief, with two studies showing 
a link (Gopnik & Rosati, 2001; Mitroff et al., 2006); while 
more recent evidence (Doherty & Wimmer, 2005; Wimmer 
& Doherty, 2011) failed to find a direct link between false 
belief and reversals. Studies that found a relationship inter-
preted the link as reflecting a common reliance on actively 
contrasting perspectives. The late switch to the second 
object in the picture morphing series, however, suggests that 
switching requires a strong external drive in young children 
(i.e., when the picture represents predominantly the second 
object) which may not rely on the ability to abstractly con-
trast perspectives.
Instead, stronger inhibitory skills facilitated reversals in 
a previous set of studies (Wimmer & Doherty, 2011) which 
suggested that only if the current interpretation can be inhib-
ited, can the second interpretation be identified. Critically, 
performance can either benefit from a top–down inhibitory 
insight (i.e., knowing what to inhibit) or from a more general 
bottom–up inhibitory strength (i.e., having enough power 
to inhibit; Wimmer & Doherty, 2011). If performance was 
predicted by the Simon task (Experiment 2), but not by the 
Stroop task (Experiment 1), it would favor the latter expla-
nation. While the Stroop task assesses the ability to inhibit 
cognitive interference, the Simon task requires interference 
resolution at the stimulus response level. Neither the correla-
tion with the Stroop task (Experiment 1) nor the correlation 
with the Simon task (Experiment 2) remained significant 
after controlling for age, which suggests that improvements 
in the picture morphing task are not explained by improve-
ments in inhibitory strength.
The late shift in our child sample may instead reflect limi-
tations in working memory capacity, particularly as working 
memory measures are typically correlated with inhibition 
measures (Davidson et al., 2006). Indeed, switching to a new 
interpretation requires mental manipulation. In addition to 
perceiving the picture, participants have to go through dif-
ferent interpretation alternatives at the same time, a process 
that particularly young children may find too taxing. Data 
from a pilot study, however, speak against this explanation. 
Table 2  Correlations [partial 
correlations controlling for 
age] between picture morphing, 
theory of mind, Simon task 
(congruent, incongruent and 
mixed), and age in Experiment 
2
+ p <0.1, *p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001 (two-tailed)
1 2 3 3a 3b 3c
1. Picture morphing – [− 0.015] [0.111] [0.115] [0.080] [0.098]
2. Theory of mind − 0.208 – [− 0.132] [− 0.138] [− 0.097] [− 0.113]
3. Simon task 0.349* − 0.321* – [0.880***] [0.824***] [0.889***]
 (a) Congruent 0.364** − 0.336* 0.917*** – [0.621***] [0.719***]
 (b) Incongruent 0.301* − 0.275* 0.870*** 0.726*** – [0.532***]
 (c) Mixed 0.285* − 0.265+ 0.906*** 0.777*** 0.628*** –
4. Age (months) − 0.516*** 0.402** − 0.547*** − 0.579*** − 0.491*** − 0.426***
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There we presented 5- to 6-year-old children6 with a manual 
version of this task where we asked them to sort the pictures 
into a “rabbit” or a “duck” box. Despite a clear reduction in 
working memory load (i.e., children had to simply compare 
the picture with the target pictures on the boxes), children 
still needed significantly more pictures before they reported 
the second object compared to adult participants reported 
in Stöttinger, Guay, Danckert and Anderson (2018); [F(1, 
115) = 21.50, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.16]).
The exceptionally late shift could potentially reflect a 
motivation issue, especially in our youngest children. Odic, 
Hock, and Halberda (2014) showed that a history of difficult, 
low-confidence perceptual decisions resulted in degraded 
performance in subsequent easier decisions in 4- to 5-year-
old children. This perceptual hysteresis (i.e., “…the persis-
tence of the initially established percept despite the evidence 
reaching values that favor the alternative percept”; p. 2; Odic 
et al., 2014) was explained by a tendency to guess without 
paying attention to the actual sensory input. Only when the 
task was easy enough did they re-attend. Although a lack 
of trying could potentially account for our data, Odic et al. 
(2014) only found evidence for perceptual hysteresis when 
children were provided with explicit (i.e., correct/incorrect) 
feedback. This effect disappeared after explicit feedback 
was removed. Given that no explicit feedback was provided 
in our picture morphing task, we deem it unlikely that low 
motivation due to constant discouraging feedback could fully 
account for our data. Also, our eye tracking data confirm that 
children were paying attention to the stimuli throughout the 
procedure.
It is also possible that the delayed switch to the second 
interpretation in the picture morphing task reflects a deeper 
conceptual issue in children. French, Menendez, Herrmann, 
Evans, and Rosengren (2018), for example, showed that chil-
dren (in particular) and adults (to a lesser extent) had persis-
tent problems reasoning about certain types of changes in 
biological organism that occur over the life-span (e.g., the 
metamorphosis of a caterpillar changing into a butterfly). 
Confronted with an unfamiliar animal, children and adults 
apply the default cognitive constraint that physical features 
remain stable across the life-cycle. This constraint helps us 
to maintain an image of a stable world in which ducks do not 
change into rabbits. The acknowledgement of such metamor-
phosis increases with age as children become more familiar 
with the concept. This could explain why younger children 
retained a stronger bias to resist such changes than older 
children and adults.
Alternatively, eye tracking data of Experiment 1 showed 
that children who employed a more extensive exploration 
strategy (i.e., longer and higher number of fixations in 
Experiment 1) identified the second object earlier. Typi-
cally, a larger number of fixations are associated with being 
a novice to a scene (Kelly, Rainford, Darcy, Kavanagh, & 
Toomey, 2016), thus requiring more fixations to cover the 
visual space. In this respect, it is plausible that more fixa-
tions indicate acknowledging novelty to a stimulus in our 
task. However, none of our children were experts, and it is, 
therefore, possible that a larger number of fixations have led 
to a benefit of finding crucial cues. A focus on specific parts 
of an ambiguous stimulus (e.g., the rabbit’s ears) will favor 
one interpretation (rabbit) over the other (Tsal & Kolbet, 
1985). Although Wimmer and Doherty (2007) failed to find 
evidence for a causal relation between search patterns and 
reversals of ambiguous figures in 3- to 5-year olds, our quali-
tative ROI analysis did show an interesting trend: children 
who recognized the duck earlier showed a broader allocation 
of attention than children who identified the duck later. It 
remains unclear why some children adopted a more exten-
sive looking pattern than others. None of the indicators that 
we had in mind (i.e., false belief and inhibition) correlated 
with eye-tracking measures.
However, even if children benefited from a higher number 
of fixations, and a more diverse looking pattern, only the 
oldes children started to approach adult level performance. 
Assuming that scanning strategies were not the main causal 
factor for this difference, successful recognition of the 
emerging animal may additionally require high-level (cogni-
tive) search strategies. Adult participants consistently report 
the target object at a point when the picture still represents 
more the first object than the second. Interestingly, this is 
only the case when the picture is presented in a gradual con-
text compared to when the same picture is presented outside 
of the morphing context (Egré, Ripley, & Verheyen, 2018; 
Stöttinger et al. 2018; Stöttinger, Sepahvand, Danckert, & 
Anderson, 2016). This effect is reversed after damage to 
the right hemisphere: right-brain-damaged patients need 
significantly more pictures to identify the emerging object 
when it is presented in the gradual compared to the indi-
vidual condition (Stöttinger et al., 2018). It is speculated 
that healthy adult participants use high-level “exploratory” 
search strategies (e.g., it started out as a duck, but what else 
could it be?)—an exploration strategy that may be impaired 
after damage to the right hemisphere (Danckert et al., 2012; 
Mohammadi Sepahvand, Stöttinger, Danckert, & Anderson, 
2014). Such exploration strategies may also be late develop-
ing in children.
The very late shift in children and in right-brain-dam-
aged patients might be the result of a fundamentally differ-
ent exploration strategy compared to healthy adults. When 
one object gradually morphs into another in the picture 
morphing task, focusing on locally changing elements does 
not support identification of the object. Only the ability to 
impose a holistic, “Gestalt-like” template (Van de Cruys 6 N = 40; Mage = 66.90 ± 4.25 months; 19 girls.
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et al., 2014) of an imagined object onto the current item 
enables the exploration of potential fits (see Rock et al. 
1994; Wimmer & Doherty, 2011 for the same argument in 
the context of ambiguous figures). A local bias can explain 
why children and right-brain-damaged patients struggle to 
recognize the second object. The suggestion here is that for 
the patients, damage to the right hemisphere has disrupted 
global processing; while for the children, these processes 
have yet to fully develop (Moses et al., 2002 for a review). 
For example, when confronted with a shape (e.g., the letter 
H) composed of smaller elements (e.g., small As), right-
brain-damaged patients are able to remember details but not 
the overall pattern, while results are reversed in patients with 
a damage to the left side of the brain (Delis, Robertson, 
& Efron, 1986). Similarly, right-brain-damaged patients 
typically comment on the local changes in the picture mor-
phing task (e.g., duck, duck with beak open, duck with a 
wider beak, duck looking up, etc.) but struggle to shift to 
a new interpretation (i.e., rabbit; Stöttinger et al., 2014). 
The same local over global bias is found in children. For 
example, 6-year olds use a local “piecemeal approach” when 
asked to copy a Rey–Osterrieth Complex Figure. That is, 
they tend to copy one small detail after the other instead 
of starting with the global shape and adding details after-
wards (Akshoomoff & Stiles, 1995a; Akshoomoff & Stiles, 
1995b; Martens, Hurks, & Jolles, 2014). In a similar vein, 
when confronted with the Kanizsa illusion (i.e., black “pac-
man” shapes arranged to induce a contour illusion of a bright 
white triangle in the middle) 4-year olds focus more on the 
local—illusion inducing “pacman” shapes, while 7-year old 
children show an adult-like bias towards the global “illusory 
middle shape” (Nayar, Franchak, Adolph, & Kiorpes, 2015). 
This shift from a local to a global processing style is accom-
panied by a developing hemispheric specialization in the 
brain. Moses et al. (2002), for example, showed that children 
who performed like adults in a hierarchical figure task (i.e., 
global shapes composed of smaller elements) also showed 
the same adult-like right hemispheric preference for global 
processing. While some studies report a transition from local 
to global processing around 6 years of age (Dukette & Stiles, 
1996; Kimchi, Hadad, Behrmann, & Palmer, 2005; Martens 
et al., 2014; Poirel, Mellet, Houdé, & Pineau, 2008), others 
find evidence for development further into the teenage years 
(see Nayar et al., 2015 for a review). Qualitative ROI pattern 
analysis of our eye-tracking data supports the idea that a 
local bias protracts identification of the second object in the 
picture morphing task. Children who struggled to identify 
the duck in the “duck–rabbit” picture set did indeed focus 
mainly on one detail (i.e., eye; Fig. 3).
In two separate studies, we showed that children gradu-
ally improve beyond pre-school age in a continuous version 
of the ambiguous figures task—a finding that was highly 
reliable. We speculate that a local over global exploration 
style can account for our findings. Future studies will have 
to investigate whether it is indeed a local processing style 
that hinders children to switch to the second interpreta-
tion, or whether children’s ability to explore and generate 
plausible alternative interpretations or the default heuristic 
of assuming feature stability is causing the delay in their 
performance.
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